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Under the New Basel Accord, bank capital adequacy rules (Pillar 1) are
substantially revised—but the introduction of two new dimensions to the
regulatory framework is, perhaps, of even greater signiﬁcance. Pillar 2 in-
creases the number of instruments available to the regulator: (1) intensify-
ing monitoring, (2) restricting the payment of dividends, (3) requiring the
preparation and implementation of a satisfactory capital-adequacy restor-
ation plan, and (4) requiring the bank to raise additional capital immedi-
ately. Pillar 3 enhances disclosure (that is, publicly available information).
This paper investigates the consequences of adding Pillar 2 alongside Pil-
lar 1 in terms of bank risk taking and the scale of bank lending. The results
suggest that Pillar 2 should more properly be seen as a substitute for, rather
than a complement to, Pillar 1, and that, in particular, Pillar 2 aﬀects bank
risk taking only when Pillar 1 rules cannot be eﬀectively enforced.
If regulators are able to enforce a risk-based capital requirements rule at
all times, then both failure and, consequently, calls on the deposit insur-
ance fund can be eﬀectively eliminated. In this case, the details of the rule
are of little importance because as soon as capital reaches some lower
threshold1 the regulator simply has to force the bank to invest entirely in
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1. The conclusion that continuous monitoring and perfect liquidity would eliminate the
possibility of default rests on the assumption of asset price continuity, that is, the absence of
jumps. In the context of a single obligor this assumption is indeed critical but, for banks withriskless assets. Under these conditions additional regulatory instruments
such as Pillars 2 and 3 would have no role.2 Thus, the design of capital re-
quirements is a signiﬁcant problem only in the case when the regulator is
either unable to observe the bank’s portfolio perfectly or lacks the author-
ity to force changes in its composition. In this event, and if they are able 
to change their portfolio composition over time—that is, engage in risk
management3—banks may deliberately deviate from compliance with capi-
tal adequacy rules, in other words, they may cheat. Under these circum-
stances, instruments such as Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 may not be redundant.
Our paper focuses on the interaction between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 when
banks are able to use risk management to cheat in relation to capital re-
quirements.
We construct a model of bank behavior in which banks manage their
portfolios in the interests of their shareholders subject to the constraints
imposed by regulation. These regulatory constraints include not only cap-
ital requirements but actions on closure and recapitalization taken by the
regulator under the new Pillar 2.
Our model has three main innovations. First, the model includes both
costly recapitalization and dynamic portfolio management. The latter
means that banks are concerned about survival as well as exploiting de-
posit insurance. Second, we consider explicitly a regime in which banks’
compliance with capital requirements is imperfect; that is, a world where
banks can cheat. In our analysis we consider two cases. In the ﬁrst, the im-
plementation of capital requirements is relatively eﬀective and banks are
constrained to be quite close to compliance at all points in time. In the sec-
ond, the implementation of capital requirements is less eﬀective, allowing
banks to deviate substantially from the ideal of compliance at all points in
time. Thus, in the ﬁrst of these cases there is extensive cheating and, in the
second, only limited cheating. Third, we model Pillar 2 as a threshold level
such that, if a bank’s capital falls below this level at the time of an audit, 
it must either recapitalize or face closure. This view of Pillar 2 is similar 
to the concept of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) promulgated by the
FDIC. This additional constraint on the bank’s capital position gives the
regulator an extra degree of freedom. In this sense it is therefore a simple
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large, well-diversiﬁed portfolios, the conclusion is much more robust—in the sense that a
jump in the value of a claim on a single counterpart would have only a small eﬀect on the value
of the portfolio as a whole.
2. A similar point is made by Berlin, Saunders, and Udell (1991, p. 740), who point out that,
with perfect observability, even capital requirements are redundant and could be replaced by
a simple closure rule: “A credible net-worth closure rule for banks relegates depositor disci-
pline to a minor role. Indeed, a totally credible and error- and forbearance free closure rule
removes any need for depositors to monitor bank risk at all since they would never lose on
closure.”
3. We use the term risk management to include any action that (deliberately) changes the
risk of the bank’s position over time.constraint on leverage. We also consider the case when a bank that recap-
italizes at the Pillar 2 threshold level incurs a ﬁxed cost. This cost may be
thought of as an increase in compliance costs brought about by more in-
tensive scrutiny on the part of the regulator, the frictional cost of recapi-
talization or, simply, as a ﬁne.
Our analysis addresses the trade-oﬀbetween the costs and beneﬁts of the
regulatory framework. Thus we need to consider not only measures of the
negative externalities associated with bank failure but also some measure
of the cost of regulation imposed by constraining bank activity. Therefore
we include the probability of bank closure and the value of deposit insur-
ance liabilities (PVDIL) as measures of the negative externalities of bank
risk taking, and the average investment in risky assets and capital utiliza-
tion as, respectively, measures of bank activity, to reﬂect the negative ex-
ternality of reduced activity induced by regulation, and the private costs
associated with high capital levels.
Our paper focuses on two main questions: (1) what is the eﬀect of risk-
based capital regulation (RBCR) on the trade-oﬀ between the costs and
beneﬁts of banking activity (a) when the bank manages its portfolio dy-
namically; (b) when, at the time of an audit, the bank’s capital is below a
certain threshold level, the bank must either recapitalize or it will be closed
and (c) when banks’ compliance with RBCR is imperfect? and (2) how
does the answer to the ﬁrst question change when the regulator imposes a
Pillar 2/PCA leverage constraint in addition to RBCR?
In our results we distinguish between a regime where there is only lim-
ited cheating and where there is extensive cheating. In the ﬁrst case, RBCR
are still eﬀective in that they reduce the cost of failure as measured by the
probability of closure and the PVDIL. Importantly, when there is limited
cheating, we ﬁnd that the level of investment in risky assets is relatively
unaﬀected by the level of RBCR. On the other hand, when there is extensive
cheating, we ﬁnd that increasing capital requirements reduces banks’ in-
vestment in risky assets and increases the probability of failure.
In relation to question (2), we ask whether an intervention rule in the
spirit of Pillar 2/PCA and based simply on leverage rather than portfolio
risk is eﬀective in conjunction with RBCR. We show that Pillar 2/PCA is
indeed eﬀective in reducing PVDIL: substantially when there is extensive
cheating, and more modestly when there is limited cheating. When there is
only limited cheating, Pillar 2/PCA increases the probability of bank clo-
sure and decreases the amount invested in risky assets. In the latter case,
and especially taking into account the costs of more frequent recapitaliza-
tion, it is possible that the net beneﬁts of Pillar 2/PCA may be negative.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 8.2 and 8.3 describe the New
Basel Accord and its main advantages and drawbacks. Section 8.4 de-
scribes the model and characterizes the bank’s optimal investment deci-
sions. Section 8.5 introduces the costs of recapitalization and examines
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analysis introducing risk-based capital requirements (Pillar 1). Section 8.7
presents the results of the interaction between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, and sec-
tion 8.8 concludes.
8.2 The New Basel Accord: A Brief Description
In the early 1980s, as concern about the ﬁnancial health of international
banks mounted and complaints of unfair competition increased, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the revision
of capital standards. An agreement was reached in July 1988, under which
new rules would be phased in by January 1993 (Basel Committee 1988).
The Basel Accord of 1988 explicitly considered only credit risk, and the
scheme was based entirely on capital requirements. These requirements,
still in force, comprise four elements: (1) the deﬁnition of regulatory capi-
tal, (2) the deﬁnition of the assets subject to risk weighting, (3) the risk
weighting system, and (4) the minimum ratio of 8 percent.4
When the Accord was introduced in 1988, its design was criticized as be-
ing too crude and for its one-size-ﬁts-all approach.5 Given these short-
comings, together with the experience accumulated since the Accord was
introduced, the Basel Committee is considering revising the current accord
(Basel Committee 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005).
The proposed new accord diﬀers from the old one in two major respects.
First, it allows the use of internal models by banks to assess the riskiness 
of their portfolios and to determine their required capital cushion. This
applies to credit risk as well as to operational risk, and delegates to a sig-
niﬁcant extent the determination of regulatory capital-adequacy require-
ments. This regime is available to banks if they choose this option and if
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4. Following its introduction, the accord has been ﬁne-tuned to accommodate ﬁnancial in-
novation and some of the risks not initially considered. For example, it was amended in 1995
and 1996 to require banks to set aside capital in order to cover the risk of losses arising from
movements in market prices. In 1995, the required capital charge was based on the “standard
approach” similar to that applied to credit risk. The standard approach deﬁnes the risk
charges associated with each position and speciﬁes how any risk position has to be aggregated
into the overall market risk capital charge. The amendment of 1996 allows banks to use, as an
alternative to the standard approach, their internal models to determine the required capital
charge for market risk. The internal model approach allows a bank to use its model to esti-
mate the Value-at-Risk (VaR) in its trading account; that is, the maximum loss that the port-
folio is likely to experience over a given holding period with a certain probability. The market
risk capital requirement is then set based on the VaR estimate. The main novelty of this ap-
proach is that it accounts for risk reduction in the portfolio resulting from hedging and di-
versiﬁcation.
5. The main criticisms were, among other things, (1) the capital ratio appeared to lack eco-
nomic foundation, (2) the risk weights did not reﬂect accurately the risk of the obligor, and (3)
it did not account for the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation. One of the main problems with the ex-
isting accord is the ability of banks to arbitrage their regulatory capital requirements (see
Jones 2000) and exploit divergences between true economic risk and risk measured under the
accord.their internal model is validated by the regulatory authority. Second, by
adding two additional pillars alongside the traditional focus on minimum
bank capital, the new accord acknowledges the importance of comple-
mentary mechanisms to safeguard against bank failure. Thus, the new
capital adequacy scheme is based on three pillars: (1) capital adequacy
requirements (Pillar 1), (2) supervisory review (Pillar 2), and (3) market
discipline (Pillar 3).
With regard to the ﬁrst pillar, the Committee proposes two approaches.
The ﬁrst, so-called “standardized” approach, adopts external ratings, such
as those provided by rating agencies, export credit agencies, and other
qualiﬁed institutions. The second approach, called the “Internal rating-
based approach,” allows the use of internal rating systems developed by
banks (subject to their meeting speciﬁc criteria yet to be deﬁned), and val-
idation by the relevant national supervisory authority. The internal ratings
approach is also divided in two broad approaches: the “advanced” and the
“foundation.” The former gives some discretion to banks in choosing the
parameters that determine risk weights, and consequently, in determining
their capital requirements. The foundation approach, in contrast, provides
little discretion.6
As far as the second pillar is concerned, the proposals of the Basel Com-
mittee underline the importance of supervisory activity such as reports and
inspections. These are carried out by individual national authorities who
are authorized to impose, through moral suasion, higher capital require-
ments than the minimum under the capital adequacy rules. In particular,
Pillar 2 emphasizes the importance of the supervisory review process as an
essential element of the new Accord (see Santos 2001). Pillar 2 encourages
banks to develop internal economic capital assessments, appropriate to
their own risk proﬁles, for identifying, measuring, and controlling risks.
The emphasis on internal assessments of capital adequacy recognizes that
any rules-based approach will inevitably lag behind the changing risk
proﬁles of complex banking organizations. Banks’ internal assessments
should give explicit recognition to the quality of the risk management and
control processes and to risks not fully addressed in Pillar 1. Importantly,
Pillar 2 provides the basis for supervisory intervention and allows regula-
tors to consider a range of options if they become concerned that banks are
not meeting the requirements. These actions may include more intense
monitoring of the bank; restricting the payment of dividends; requiring the
bank to prepare and implement a satisfactory capital-adequacy restora-
tion plan; and requiring the bank to raise additional capital immediately.
Supervisors should have the discretion to use the tools best suited to the
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6. In addition to revising the criteria for the determination of the minimum capital associ-
ated to the credit risk of individual exposures, the reform proposals advanced by the com-
mittee introduce a capital requirement for operational risks, which is in turn determined us-
ing three diﬀerent approaches presenting a growing degree of sophistication.circumstances of the bank and its operating environment (New Accord:
Principle 4: 717).
Finally, the third pillar is intended to encourage banks to disclose infor-
mation in order to enhance the role of the market in monitoring banks. To
that end, the Committee is proposing that banks disclose information on,
among other things, the composition of their regulatory capital, risk ex-
posures, and risk-based capital ratios computed in accordance with the
Accord’s methodology.
In the light of these objectives, the Basel Committee has articulated four
principles: (1) Each bank should assess its internal capital adequacy in
light of its risk proﬁle, (2) Supervisors should review internal assessments,
(3) Banks should hold capital above regulatory minimums, and (4) Super-
visors should intervene at an early stage.
The descriptions of the second and third pillars by the Basel Committee
are not as extensive or detailed as that of the ﬁrst. Nevertheless, it is signif-
icant that for the ﬁrst time in international capital regulation, supervision
and market discipline are placed at the same point of the hierarchy as the
regulatory minimum. In discussing the second pillar the proposal states
that: “The supervisory review process should not be viewed as a discre-
tionary pillar but, rather, as a critical complement to both the minimum
regulatory capital requirement and market discipline” (Basel Committee
1999, p. 53).
In this paper we analyze the eﬀects of Pillar 2 intervention and, in par-
ticular, the interaction between Pillar 2 and Pillar 1. We characterize Pillar
2 as a threshold level of leverage such that a bank with higher leverage than
this threshold at the time of an audit is required either to recapitalize or to
close. If a bank recapitalizes it incurs a cost. This characterization is there-
fore ﬁrmly in the spirit of both PCA and Basel II.
We show ﬁrst that Pillar 2 intervention has a signiﬁcant impact on the
frequency of bank closure and the value of deposit insurance liabilities
only when regulators are unable to force banks to comply with Pillar 1 risk-
based capital requirements at all times. This may arise, for example, as the
result of monitoring costs. If banks always comply with risk-based capital
requirements then both failure rates and the present value of deposit in-
surance liability go to zero.7
However, if banks do not always comply with Pillar 1 capital require-
ments, Pillar 2 may have a role, by inducing banks to manage their portfo-
lios so as to reduce the likelihood of incurring recapitalization costs. A cen-
tral issue that we explore in the paper is the interaction between the level of
risk-based capital requirements (Pillar 1), the threshold leverage level (Pil-
lar 2) and the degree of noncompliance with Pillar 1 rules. More particu-
larly, we investigate whether, as the regulators hope, Pillar 2 does indeed act
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7. Unless there are jumps in the value of the portfolio of bank assets.as complement to Pillar 1—in the sense that it increases the eﬀectiveness of
Pillar 1—or whether it is simply a substitute, a second line of defense.
8.3 Advantages and Main Drawbacks of the New Accord
The Basel Committee’s proposals can be seen as an attempt to address
some of the drawbacks of the previous capital adequacy scheme. In partic-
ular, the new accord represents an advance in three main areas. First, with
the objective of making capital requirements more risk sensitive, it intro-
duces a more accurate framework for the assessment of risk, in particular
credit risk. Although the new proposals have undoubtedly raised the level
of the analysis of credit risk from the ﬁrst accord, there remain some im-
portant questions about some aspects; for example, how the correlation of
credit exposures is treated. Moreover, for the ﬁrst time the rules explicitly in-
clude operational risk as one of the determinants of required capital (Pillar
1). The new rules will also enhance the role of banks’ internal assessments
of risk as the basis for capital requirements. Second, the new accord repre-
sents an attempt on the part of regulators to lower the impact of capital reg-
ulation as a source of competitive inequality by reducing the opportunity
for regulatory arbitrage. Third, the new accord enhances the role for regu-
latory review and intervention (Pillar 2) and market discipline (Pillar 3).
In introducing an extension to the current accord that concentrates only
on capital requirements, Basel II is more consistent with the consensus of
the literature on asymmetries of information; that, in general, it is advan-
tageous to consider a menu-based approach rather than a uniform one-
size-ﬁts-all rule.8 The limitations of a simple capital-adequacy approach in
our paper arise when bank portfolios are imperfectly observable by the
auditor and banks are able to engage in dynamic portfolio management.
Nonetheless, it appears that the new accord does have some signiﬁcant
weaknesses and, among these, we draw particular attention to the following.
A major problem—long present in the literature—in assessing develop-
ments in banking regulation, and ﬁnancial regulation in general, is that
there is little discussion, and certainly no consensus, on the objectives that
the regulator should pursue (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). The two most-
commonly cited justiﬁcations for bank regulation, and capital regulation
in particular, are (1) the mitigation of systemic risks (see Goodhart et al.
1998, and Benston and Kaufman 1996 among others) and (2) the need to
control the value of deposit insurance liabilities (see Merton 1997, Genotte
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8. See Kane (1990) and Goodhart et al. (1998) for a discussion of the principal-agent prob-
lems that can arise between regulators and regulated, and Hauswald and Senbet (1999) for the
design of optimal banking regulation in the presence of incentive conﬂicts between regulators
and society. For other analysis of the interplay between capital regulation and monitoring 
of the bank by a regulator, see Campbell, Chan, and Marino (1992) and Milne and Whalley
(2001).and Pyle 1991, Buser, Chen, and Kane 1981, Chan, Greenbaum, and
Thakor 1992, and Diamond and Dybvig 1986, among others). Indeed, the
authors of the Basel II proposals refer to their “fundamental objective . . .
to develop a framework that would further enhance the soundness and sta-
bility of the international banking system.”
Thus it might seem curious to an outsider that the new Basel II accord is
so little concerned with the problem of systemic risk, which has for so long
been seen as central to the design of bank regulation. Nonetheless we ﬁnd
this nonsystemic same view expressed repeatedly by the regulators in de-
scribing the goals of the new accord. For example, the following quotation,
which comes from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) itself, ad-
dresses what we would regard as some of the central questions in bank reg-
ulation, and does so without any reference to systemic costs:
Why are banks subject to capital requirements?
Nearly all jurisdictions with active banking markets require banking
organizations to maintain at least a minimum level of capital. Capital
serves as a foundation for a bank’s future growth and as a cushion
against its unexpected losses. Adequately capitalized banks that are well
managed are better able to withstand losses and to provide credit to con-
sumers and businesses alike throughout the business cycle, including
during downturns. Adequate levels of capital thereby help to promote
public conﬁdence in the banking system.
Why is a new capital standard necessary today?
Advances in risk management practices, technology, and banking mar-
kets have made the 1988 Accord’s simple approach to measuring capital
less meaningful for many banking organizations.
What is the goal for the Basel II Framework and how will it be accom-
plished?
The overarching goal for the Basel II Framework is to promote the ade-
quate capitalization of banks and to encourage improvements in risk
management, thereby strengthening the stability of the ﬁnancial system.
This goal will be accomplished through the introduction of “three pil-
lars” that reinforce each other and that create incentives for banks to en-
hance the quality of their control processes. (BIS 2004)
The connection between the objective of enhancing the “soundness and
stability” of the banking system and the speciﬁcs of the proposal, partic-
ularly in relation to systemic risk, are unclear. More broadly, the Basel II
Accord is almost silent on the presence of externalities such as systemic
failure and contagion, which would be regarded by many as the princi-
pal justiﬁcation for regulatory intervention (Berlin, Saunders, and Uddell
1991, Allen and Gale 2003). Without externalities, decisions—for ex-
ample, on capital structure—that are optimal from the private perspective
of bank owners would also be socially optimal and, in this case, there
would be no need for regulation.
384 Loriana Pelizzon and Stephen SchaeferThe “externality-free” view of regulation that Basel II appears to es-
pouse is also reﬂected in Pillar 3. This seeks to “encourage market disci-
pline by developing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market
participants to assess key information about a bank’s risk proﬁle and level
of capitalization” (Basel Committee 2005, p. 184). However, it is unclear
what impact greater transparency would have. If capital requirements are
set without reference to the social costs of failure—that is, regulatory cap-
ital requirements coincide with privately optimal levels of capital—then
banks are, in any case, incentivized to maintain these levels, and greater
transparency would have little eﬀect. If capital requirements do reﬂect the
social costs of failure—that is, are higher than those banks would choose
privately—then it is not clear how disclosing to a private counterparty a
deﬁcit against regulatory capital requirements would give the bank any in-
centive to increase capital.
When systemic costs are taken into account, optimal regulatory design
involves trading oﬀthe social beneﬁts of, for example, a lower frequency of
failure with the private costs of achieving this. But when systemic issues are
excluded from the analysis, there is no trade-oﬀ, because the interests of
private owners and social welfare coincide. In this case the prescriptions of
the regulator are those that the bank would optimally choose for itself and
the regulator becomes a sort of “super consultant” helping to promote
good practice and sound analysis. These are worthy objectives, but it is un-
clear why they need to be promoted within a legal framework such as Basel
II. For example, the Basel Committee states that it “believes that the re-
vised framework will promote the adoption of stronger risk management
practices by the banking industry” (Basel Committee 2005, p. 2). While un-
doubtedly desirable, it is not clear how improving management practice in
the area of risk management addresses the broad objectives of soundness
and stability or, indeed, that banks themselves are not in a better position
to decide on the appropriate level of investment in risk management.
The absence in the Basel Accord of any substantial discussion of costs is
a major omission.9 For example, if the costs imposed by capital require-
ments were small while the social costs of failure were signiﬁcant, required
capital should be set to suﬃciently high levels that the incidence of bank
failure would be minimal. The fact that no bank regulator proposes such a
regime suggests that regulators at least consider that the costs imposed by
capital regulation are signiﬁcant. Certainly the U.S. House of Representa-
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9. References to the cost of capital requirements by the Basel Committee are rare. Among
the small number of examples, the following quotation makes an implicit reference to cost
when it refers to the possibility that capital level might be “too high”: “The technical chal-
lenge for both banks and supervisors has been to determine how much capital is necessary to
serve as a suﬃcient buﬀer against unexpected losses. If capital levels are too low, banks may
be unable to absorb high levels of losses. Excessively low levels of capital increase the risk of
bank failures which, in turn, may put depositors’ funds at risk. If capital levels are too high,
banks may not be able to make the most eﬃcient use of their resources, which may constrain
their ability to make credit available” (BIS, 2004, p. 1).tives Committee on Financial Services (USHRCFS) has reservations
about the costs imposed by capital requirements: “We are concerned that
the bank capital charges created by Basel II, if implemented, could be
overly onerous and may discourage banks from engaging in activities
which promote economic developments.”10
In our analysis we reﬂect the trade-oﬀ between, on one hand, the public
and private costs of failure and, on the other, the costs imposed by regula-
tion. Ideally, alternative designs for Basel II would ﬁnd the best trade-oﬀ
between these costs using a general equilibriumapproach.11In the absence
of such a model, we focus on four outcome variables that are plausible can-
didates for the arguments of the welfare function that might be derived
from an equilibrium model.
The ﬁrst is the PVDIL: the cost of insuring deposits. The second is the
frequency of bank closure, which we regard as an index of the systemic cost
of failure. All else equal, a low frequency of failure would promote conﬁ-
dence in the banking system and enhance the eﬃciency of the payments
mechanism (see Diamond and Dybvig 1986).
Third, there is a widely held—if imperfectly articulated—view, reﬂected
in the concerns expressed by the USHRCFS, that high levels of capital im-
pose a cost on banks. In our analysis we use the average level of bank cap-
ital as a measure of this cost.
Finally, we wish to capture the positive externalities that may arise from
banking activity, for example, bank lending. Clearly, a capital require-
ments regime that was so onerous as to substantially eliminate banking ac-
tivity would also reduce both the frequency of failure and the PVDIL to
zero. A former chairman of the London Stock Exchange once referred to
this approach as the “regulation of the graveyard.” The previous quotation
from the USHRCFS suggests that they share these concerns and so we also
report the average level of risky assets held as a proxy for banks’ contribu-
tion to economic activity through lending.
The Basel Committee has attempted to assess the potential impact of the
new accord on capital requirements for diﬀerent types of banks in a vari-
ety of countries by carrying out Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS). These
entail each bank recalculating capital requirements for its current portfo-
lio under the new accord. However, the QIS calculations were conducted
under ceteris paribus assumptions and did not attempt to take into ac-
count any behavioral response on the part of banks to the new accord. One
of the aims of this paper is to provide a framework within which the be-
havioral response of banks to changes in regulation might be studied.
386 Loriana Pelizzon and Stephen Schaefer
10. U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services letter to the chairmen
of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of
the Oﬃce of Thrift Supervision, November 3, 2003, p. 2.
11. See, for example, Suarez and Repullo (2004). However, deﬁning an appropriate social
welfare function is always problematical.Pillars 2 and 3 are major innovations in the new accord and represent an
explicit recognition that capital supervision involves more than capital re-
quirements. Pillar 2, in particular, adds an important instrument to the
bank regulator’s armory and allows for some discretion over important
elements such as closure, dividend payments, and recapitalization. Pillar 
3, by encouraging transparency, attempts to capture the beneﬁts of market
discipline. However, two important issues remain. First, as other authors
(see Saidenberg and Schuermann 2003 and von Thadden 2003) have
pointed out, there is a substantial imbalance in the detail provided by the
committee between Pillar 1, on one hand, and Pillars 2 and 3 on the other.
The focus of the committee’s attention seems clear. Second, and more im-
portant, there is no discussion of the interaction between capital rules and
market discipline and the rules governing closure, dividend payments, and
recapitalization.
The main aim of this paper is to try to provide a framework within which
to analyze the relations between capital requirements and closure, divi-
dend payments, and recapitalization. Descamps, Rochet, and Roger (2003)
have also drawn attention to the importance of this issue.
Finally, one aspect of the objectives of Basel II is to ensure that “capital
adequacy regulation will not be a signiﬁcant source of competitive inequal-
ity among internationally active banks” (Basel Committee 2005, p. 2).
However, trying to make regulation neutral with respect to competition
(the level playing ﬁeld) is a more demanding objective. First, regulation al-
most inevitably aﬀects competition because it aﬀects bank costs. Second,
if the regulator attempts to design capital requirements, say, by ﬁnding the
optimal trade-oﬀ between private and social costs, then capital rules will
almost inevitably vary across banks unless they are all identical in terms of
their social costs (e.g., of failure). Diﬀerentiation of this kind—for ex-
ample, between large banks and small banks—is not found in the Basel II
rules or, indeed, in other capital adequacy regimes. It appears that the pres-
sure on regulators for equal treatment among banks dominates a more
ﬁne-tuned approach to regulatory design.
8.4 The Model
8.4.1 Timing and Assumptions
In our model a bank is an institution that holds ﬁnancial assets and is ﬁ-
nanced by equity and deposits.
Bank Shareholders and Depositors
Shareholders are risk neutral, enjoy limited liability, and are initially
granted a banking charter. The charter permits the bank to continue in
business indeﬁnitely under the control of its shareholders unless, at the
Pillar 1 versus Pillar 2 under Risk Management 387time of an audit, the regulator ﬁnds the bank is in violation of regulations
such as capital requirements. In this case the charter is not renewed, the
shareholders lose control of the bank, and the value of their equity is zero.
If the bank is solvent at time t – 1, it raises deposits12 Dt–1 and capital
kDt–1, k   0 so that total assets invested are
(1) At 1   (1   k)Dt 1.
The deposits are one-period term deposits paying a total rate of return
of rd. Thus, at maturity the amount due to depositors is
(2) Dt   Dt 1(1   rd).
At this point, if the bank is solvent, the accrued interest, rdDt–1, is paid to
depositors and deposits are rolled over at the same interest rate.
Regulators and Audit Frequency
We assume that audits take place at ﬁxed times t   1, 2, . . . The govern-
ment guarantees the deposits and charges the bank a ﬁxed premium per
dollar of insured deposits that is the same for all banks.13 This premium is
included in the deposit rate r d.14
Portfolio Revisions and Investment Choice
Between successive audit dates there are n equally spaced times at which
the portfolio may be revised. Setting  t   1/n, the portfolio revision dates,
between audit dates t and t   1, are therefore
(3) t, t    t, t   2 t,  ....  .  ,  t   (n   1) t, t   1.
For simplicity we assume that the bank may choose between two assets: a
risk-free bond with maturity 1/n, yielding a constant net return r ˆ per pe-
riod of length 1/n(rper period of length 1) and a risky asset yielding a gross
random return Rt j t over the period (t   [ j – 1] t) to (t   j t).15 Returns
on the risky asset are independently distributed over time and have a con-
stant expected gross return of E(Rt j t)   (1   a ˆ ), where a ˆ is the net ex-
pected return per period of length 1/n (a per period of length 1). Notice
that we assume that, at each portfolio revision date, the bank is allowed ei-
ther to increase or decrease its investment in the risky asset; that is, the
risky asset is marketable.
In our model we assume that the only source of bank rent is deposit in-
surance—that is, rd   r   a. This may appear to be a very pessimistic view
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12. We take the volume of a bank’s deposits as exogenous.
13. This means that the deposit insurance premium is not risk dependent and is therefore
not actuarially fair.
14. Equivalently, we may interpret this arrangement as one where the depositors pay the de-
posit insurance premium and receive a net interest rate of rd.
15. This means that we do not address the issues related to portfolio diversiﬁcation as in
Boot and Thakor (1991).of banking, as in this case a bank’s only objective is to try to exploit deposit
insurance. However, we know that when banks have other sources of rents
this acts as a natural curb on excessive risk taking and capital requirements
will be less necessary. In our framework the banks that are most likely to
default are those without other signiﬁcant sources of rents, who will try to
hold as little capital as possible.
In making these assumptions we have in mind a competitive market
where the surplus associated with the projects ﬁnanced by loans is captured
entirely by the borrowers. The presence of a borrower surplus means, as we
have mentioned earlier, that lending is, on average, improving welfare. For
this reason, again as mentioned earlier, we use the volume of risky assets
held by the bank as one argument of a measure of welfare.
Portfolio Choice
Let wt j t denote the percentage of the portfolio held in the risky asset at
time t j t, with the remainder invested in the “safe” security. We limit the
leverage that the bank can take on by imposing a no-short selling con-
straint (0   wt j t   1) on both the risky and safe assets:16
(4) 0   wt j t   1   t ∈ (0,  ),   j ∈ (0, n   1)
The bank’s portfolio management strategy is represented as a sequence of
variables   ( 0,  1, . . . ,  t, . . . ,   ), with
(5)  t   (wt, wt  t, . . . , wt j t, . . . , wt j t, . . . , wt (n 1) t) for all 0   t    .
and 0   j   n –1, where  t represents the strategy between audit dates t and
t   1 and   the collection of these substrategies for audit dates 1, 2, . . . , 
t,  ...   .
Intertemporal Budget Constraint
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by
(6) At (j 1) t  [wt j tRt j t   (1   wt j t)(1   r ˆ)]At j t,
and so the bank’s asset value at the audit time t   1 is
(7) At 1   
n 1
j 0
[wt j tRt j t   (1   wt j t)(1   r ˆ )]At.
Bank Closure Rule (Transfer of Control from Shareholders to Supervisor)
Most of the previous literature has assumed a closure rule under which
banking authorities deny the renewal of the banking license and close the
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16. It may not be immediately apparent that a nonnegativity constraint on the risky asset
would ever be binding. However, under the assumptions that we introduce (limited liability)
we show that the bank will be risk preferring in some regions and would short the risky asset
if it could.bank if its net worth (asset value minus deposits) is negative at the end of a
period—that is, if the asset value is lower than the threshold point repre-
sented by the deposit value (Marcus 1984, Keeley 1990, Hellman, Mur-
dock, and Stiglitz 2000, and Pelizzon and Schaefer 2003). This closure rule
induces the bank to be prudent when the bank has a suﬃciently high rent
from deposit insurance, interest ceilings, or monopoly power in the deposit
or asset market. Such a closure policy serves as a mechanism that both
manages bank distress ex post and may also have a disciplinary eﬀect on ex
ante actions. A major drawback of this approach, however, is that share-
holders who wish to provide capital to reestablish solvency are prevented
from doing so. Among the problems raised by this assumption is the ques-
tion of whether, by refusing to allow recapitalization, the government
would be illegally expropriating the property of bank shareholders.
Thus, in this paper we consider the case where the banking authorities,
instead of closing the bank or intervening and assuming control (for equi-
tyholders this is the same as closing the bank), allow recapitalization by
shareholders17 and renewal of the license if, after recapitalization, the vol-
ume of capital meets a given minimum threshold level, k  .18 In the papers
cited in the previous paragraph, k  is a small quantity of capital that guar-
antees solvency. Later in the paper, where we introduce Pillar 2/PCA, this
threshold will be higher.
Under this rule, equityholders have an option to retain the banking li-
cense. They will exercise this option when there is an amount of capital, k∗
  k  , such that the volume of capital the bank shareholders need to raise,
k∗D   Dt – At, is lower than the value of equity, S, after recapitalization.
More formally, let the indicator variable It represent whether the bank is
open (It   1) or closed (It   0) at time t,
(8) It   
,
with I0   1.
0 if  
t 1
s 0 Is   0
0 if  
t 1
s 0 Is   1 and S   k∗D   Dt   At
1 if  
t 1
s 0 Is   1 and S   k∗D   Dt   At
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17. Other authors consider this option. See Suarez (1994), Fries, Barral, and Perraudin
(1997), and Pages and Santos (2003), among others.
18. A typical situation is when bank losses are covered by bank mergers and acquisitions.
In our framework, it is the same if capital is replenished by old or new shareholders; the key
point is that old shareholders do not lose 100 percent of the franchise value. Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994) state that this closure policy is very common in the United States (73.8 percent).
Another rescue policy documented by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) is the “open bank as-
sistance” policy, also called “bail-out.” In a bail-out the bank liquidates the defaulted assets,
the government covers the shortfall to the depositors whose claims are in default, and the
bank is not closed. This rescue policy is assimilable to our closure rule if shareholders still
maintain a proportional claim on the bank franchise value. It is also assimilable to the gov-
ernment takeover when the bank is completely nationalized.Dividend Policy and Capital Replenishment
With this new feature, the shareholder cash ﬂow (a dividend, if positive,
or equity issue amount, if negative) is
(9) dt   
8.4.2 The Problem
The bank chooses its investment policy  t ∗, (i.e., the percentage w∗
t j t in-
vested in the risky asset at each time t   j t) and the level of capital after
recapitalization, k∗. The value of equity is given by the present value of fu-
ture dividends:
(10) S0  ∑
 
t 1
(1   r) tE[dt( t, kt)]
The problem faced by the bank is to choose the policy ( t ∗, kt ∗) that max-
imizes the value to shareholders, subject to equation (4), kt   k  , and where
dividends, dt, are deﬁned in equation (9).
This problem is time invariant for any audit time because, if the bank is
solvent at audit time t, then, since the distribution of future dividends at 
t   1 is identical for all t, the portfolio problem faced by the bank is also
identical at each audit time when the bank is solvent. This means that the
value of equity at time t, conditional on solvency, is given by19
(11) St   
This quantity is constant at each audit time when the bank is solvent and
can be written as20
(12) S( ∗, k∗)   ,
where  ( ∗, k∗) is the probability of default at the next audit. Thus, the
value of equity is equal to the expected dividend divided by the sum of risk-
free rate and the probability of default. In other words, the value of equity




r    ( ∗, k∗)
∑
 
t 1(1   r) (s t)E(ds)   (1   r)[E(dt 1)   St 1] if It 1   1.
0 of It 1 0
At   Dt   k∗D if S   Dt   k∗D   At
0 otherwise.
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19. Note that dt 1 and St 1 are functions of the portfolio strategy,  t, and the level of capi-
tal, kt, but, for sake of notational clarity, we suppress this dependence.
20. For details see Pelizzon and Schaefer (2003).
21. A similar relation obtained in a number of models of defaultable bonds (see Lando 1997
and Duﬃe and Singleton 1999).The bank’s portfolio and capital problem may also be deﬁned as the
maximization of the franchise value, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the
value of equity and the amount of capital, k∗, provided by shareholders:
(13) F   S( ∗, k∗)   k∗D.
8.4.3 Welfare Function Variables
To evaluate the performance of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 we need some mea-
sures of the welfare outcomes to which these rules give rise. In the absence
of a formal welfare function, and as described earlier, we employ the fol-
lowing four measures: (1) the probability of bank closure, (2) the value of
deposit insurance liabilities (PVDIL) as measures of the negative external-
ities of bank risk taking, (3) the average investment in risky assets and the
capital utilization as, respectively, measures of bank activity, to reﬂect the
positive externalities of bank lending, and (4) the private costs associated
with high capital levels.
The ﬁrst measure, the probability of bank closure,  , has already been
described above. Using equations (9), (11), and (12), it is straightforward
to show that the PVDIL of the bank can be written as
(14)   PVDIL,
where “Put” represents the payoﬀon a one-period option held by the bank
on the deposit insurance scheme—that is,
(15) Et 1(Put)   
Dt F
0
(Dt   At)f(At)dAt   E (Put).
The average investment in the risky asset, A  w  , is deﬁned as
(16) A  w    E




t j t( )At j t( ) ,
where the expectation of the term in square brackets is taken over paths for
the asset value, At j t, and portfolio proportion, w∗
t j t, and where   de-
notes the path.
Finally, the capital utilization is the optimal amount of capital that
shareholders decide to provide at time zero and at each audit date—that 
is, k∗.
8.4.4 Bank’s Optimal Policy
In this section we show that the disciplinary eﬀect of the franchise value
vanishes when closure rules allow costless recapitalization. The feedback
eﬀect of alternative closure policies on the incentives of bank owners to
1
 
n   1
E(Put)
  
r    ( ∗, k∗)
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the wide range of such policies that regulators actually employ.22 This re-
sult is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When recapitalization is allowed (and F   D), the optimal pol-
icy for the bank is the riskiest policy, irrespective of the source of the franchise
value.
Proof.
Assuming that the risky asset distribution is lognormal and constant
portfolio proportion imply that
S   (1   r) 1 
 
Dt kD S
(At  Dt   kD   S)f(At)dAt.
Clearly this is the value of a call option; increasing the investment in the
risky asset the bank rises the volatility of the asset Atand so the value of eq-
uity (i.e., the value of the call option).
Q.E.D.
This result (already proved by Suarez 1994 for the case with deposit 
rents only and Pelizzon 2001 for diﬀerent sources of rents) is driven by the
form of the payoﬀs associated with one-period decisions. Under the simple
rule described earlier, when closure takes place when the asset value is
lower than the threshold point represented by the deposit value, the payoﬀ
to shareholders at the time of an audit, when the bank continues, is given
by the sum of the dividend cash ﬂow, d (which is negative in the case of re-
capitalization) and the value of the equity in continuation, S. If, at the time
of an audit, the bank is closed when At   Dt the payoﬀ to equityholders is
zero. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 8.1.
In contrast, when recapitalization is allowed, even when the value of
assets is below that of liabilities, shareholders’ total payoﬀ is given by the 
sum of value of equity Sand the dividend cash ﬂow dwhen the value of eq-
uity after recapitalization is higher than the amount of capital contributed
(S   At – Dt   k∗D), and zero otherwise. Figure 8.2 shows the total payoﬀ
in this case.
Figures 8.1 with 8.2 diﬀer for asset values between Dt   k∗D – S and Dt.
The nonconvexity of the total payoﬀ as a function of the asset value in the
ﬁrst case explains shareholders’ aversion to risk when Fis suﬃciently high.
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22. See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for a comparison of rescue policies employed in the
developed economies of the United States, Japan, and European Nordic countries. Legisla-
tion in general calls for increasingly strict sanctions against banks as their capital levels dete-
riorate (see, for example, the Prompt Corrective Action) but still permits some regulators dis-
cretion concerning the closure of banks. See also Gupta and Misra (1999) for a review of
failure and failure resolution in the U.S. thrift and banking industries.Conversely, the convexity of the total payoﬀin the second case induces risk
loving.
As Lemma 1 states, in the case of a convex payoﬀ function, the optimal
portfolio strategy for bank is always to invest entirely in the risky asset. The
option to recapitalize in this case not only induces the bank to choose the
most risky strategy but also aﬀects the probability of default and the value
of deposit insurance liabilities (Pelizzon 2001).
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Fig. 8.1 Shareholders’ payoﬀ without the option to recapitalize
Note: This ﬁgure shows the shareholders’ payoﬀ at the next audit time under the threshold
closure rule.
Fig. 8.2. Shareholders’ payoﬀ with the option to recapitalize
Note:This ﬁgure shows the shareholders’ payoﬀat the next audit time under the option to re-
capitalize closure rule and no costs of recapitalization.8.5 Costs of Recapitalization
Thus, the case of a convex payoﬀ function analyzed by Suarez (1994) al-
lows recapitalization but leads to the prediction that banks always seek 
to maximize risk. As a characterization of actual bank behavior this ap-
proach probably has limited descriptive power. As mentioned previously,
the approach taken in earlier literature induced prudence on the part of
banks, but only by expropriating the positive franchise value that insolvent
banks (A   D) would have had if allowed to recapitalize.
In this paper we follow Suarez (1994) in allowing recapitalization for all
values of A, but with a frictional cost, v. In this case equation (9) that de-
ﬁnes the dividend becomes
(17) dt    
The presence of these costs reintroduces concavity into the bank’s payoﬀ
function and, depending on the parameters, this is suﬃcient to induce pru-
dence on the part of the bank. Figure 8.3 shows the payoﬀ to shareholders
as a function of the asset value where the bank incurs a variable cost of re-
plenishing the bank’s capital23 to a level k∗.
There is a second cost that banks incur when they recapitalize. This is a
ﬁxed cost, C, that is related to the Pillar 2/PCA intervention threshold k ˆ
and, in this case, the formula deﬁning the dividend is
(18) dt  
Our interpretation of this cost is as an increase in the direct and indirect
costs of compliance that come about as a result of the regulator increasing
its intensity of monitoring. This may be viewed in terms of increased direct
compliance costs, diversion of management time, restrictions on new busi-
ness activities, and so on. This situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 8.4where, for
simplicity, we suppress the variable cost of recapitalization that was illus-
trated in ﬁgure 8.3.
At Dt k∗Dif At Dt k∗D
(At Dt k∗D)(1  v)  Cif S Dt k∗D At
and At Dt k∗D
0 otherwise.
At  Dt   k∗D if At   Dt   k∗D
(At Dt k∗D)(1  v) if S Dt k∗D Atand At Dt k∗D
0 otherwise.
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23. Our model does not explain why equity is relatively expensive. This can be because of
tax rules, agency costs of equity, and in the case of banks, a comparative advantage in the col-
lection of deposit funds (Taggart and Greenbaum 1978). For other motivations of expensive
bank costs of capital see Boot (2001).Note that in our analysis the impact of the threshold k ˆ on the share-
holders’ payoﬀ comes entirely from the cost imposed on the bank rather
than the speciﬁcs of the action taken by the regulator (inspections, detailed
auditing, etc.).
The shape of this objective function is almost identical to the one pre-
sented in Pelizzon and Schaefer (2003) and provides the bank with an in-
centive to manage its portfolio dynamically. The optimal strategy is char-
acterized by a U-shaped relation between the amount invested in the risky
asset and the value of bank assets. This relation has a strong discontinuity.
When the bank is solvent it follows a portfolio insurance strategy, which
means that the amount invested in the risky asset falls toward zero as the
bank’s net worth falls to zero. However, when the bank becomes insolvent
by even a small amount the amount invested in the risky asset jumps to the
maximum possible.
As shown in Pelizzon and Schaefer (2003), this strategy has a strong
eﬀect on the distribution of the bank’s asset value at an audit time. More-
over, as shown in Pelizzon and Schaefer (2003), under risk management the
one-to-one relation between   and PVDIL is no longer guaranteed. In-
deed, with portfolio revision the asset risk is, in some states, lower than the
maximum, and so the average risk is also lower. We might expect, therefore,
that both   and PVDIL would be lower in the latter case. In fact, while the
probability of default is indeed lower, the PVDIL is higher. This occurs be-
cause the shape of the distribution in these two cases is diﬀerent. The rents
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Fig. 8.3 Shareholders’ payoﬀ with proportional costs of recapitalization
Note: This ﬁgure shows the shareholders’ payoﬀat the next audit time under the option to re-
capitalize closure rule and proportional costs of recapitalization.earned by the bank are generated by exploiting the deposit insurance and
so, to exploit this source of rents to the maximum, the bank uses risk man-
agement to increase the expected loss in those cases where the bank does
default, while simultaneously increasing the probability of survival and
therefore the length of time the shareholders expect to receive dividends
before closure.
A consequence of our analysis is that the value of deposit insurance is
diﬀerent when banks have the ability to engage in risk management. Ig-
noring this feature is likely to lead to an understatement of the cost of de-
posit insurance and unreliable conclusions about the consequences of
bank capital regulation. These two points are central to the analysis per-
formed in the remainder of this paper.
8.6 Risk-Based Capital Requirements (Pillar 1)
Under the 1988 Accord a bank’s required capital was a linear function
of the amount invested in risky assets. More recent rules rely on the VaR
(value-at-risk) framework. In our model there is only one risky asset and
therefore, under both the 1988 Accord and the Basel II (i.e., the VaR rule),
required capital depends only on wj, the fraction of assets invested in the
risky asset.
We assume a risk-based capital rule in which the required level of capi-
tal is proportional to the amount invested in the risky asset:
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Fig. 8.4 Shareholders’ payoﬀ with ﬁx costs of recapitalization
Note: This ﬁgure shows the shareholders’ payoﬀat the next audit time under the option to re-
capitalize closure rule and Pillar 2/PCA ﬁxed costs of recapitalization.(19) kR    wj ,
where kR is the required amount of capital expressed as a percentage of de-
posits and  is the required capital per unit of investment in the risky asset.
In the case with constant portfolio positions and normally distributed as-
set values, for example,   is the product of (1) the number of standard de-
viations deﬁning the conﬁdence level, (2) the volatility of the rate of return
on risky assets, and (3) a scaling factor.
Under this rule, which we apply in the paper, the bank’s investment in the
risky asset at each portfolio revision date, wj, is constrained according to
(20) wj   kj   w   kj, ,    ,
where w  represents the maximum permissible investment in the risky asset
for a given ratio of deposits to assets and to a percentage of capital kj, de-
ﬁned as
(21) kj   .
One of the main objectives of our paper is to analyze the eﬀects of capi-
tal regulation on bank risk taking. However, our analysis to this point as-
sumes an environment that is entirely unregulated except for the periodic
audits when, if the percentage of capital is lower than k  , the bank must ei-
ther recapitalize or is closed. Between audits, however, we have assumed
that the bank has complete freedom to choose the risk of its portfolio, even
if insolvent.
In practice, banks are required to observe capital requirements continu-
ously through time and face censure or worse, if they are discovered, even
ex post, to have violated the rules. However, if (1) asset prices are continu-
ous, (2) capital rules are applied continuously through time, and (3) capi-
tal rules force banks to eliminate risk from their portfolio when their capi-
tal falls below a given (nonnegative) level, a bank’s probability of default
becomes zero.24
With continuous portfolio revision the only way to avoid this unrealistic
conclusion is to assume—perhaps not unrealistically—that banks are able
to continue to operate, and to invest in risky assets, even when in violation
of either, or both, the leverage constraint (k  ) and the risk-based capital re-
quirements (RBCR). Without some assumption of this kind the analysis of
the eﬀect of capital requirements in a dynamic context is without content.
However, in order to say something about the eﬀects of capital require-
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24. As mentioned earlier, in this setting, the relevant assumption is the absence of jumps in
the value of the entire portfolio, a much less stringent constraint than the absence of jumps
for any single claim in the portfolio.ments in this case, we must also say something about the extent to which
banks are able to deviate from regulatory constraints on leverage and ex-
posure to risky assets. In other words, we have to make assumptions about
the extent to which banks are able to cheat.
We consider two diﬀerent levels of cheating:
1. Extensive Cheating (Ext-Cheat). Here, capital requirements are bind-
ing only when there is an audit; at all other times the bank faces no con-
straints on its portfolio. Moreover, irrespective of its portfolio composition
prior to audit, any solvent bank may reorganize its portfolio to meet capi-
tal requirements but is then constrained to hold this portfolio up to the next
portfolio revision date. In all other periods the portfolio is unconstrained,
so the bank satisﬁes the RBCR audit simply by window dressing its port-
folio for the audit date. In this highly ineﬀective capital-requirements
regime, a regulator is able to monitor and control the activities of banks
only at the time of an audit.
(22) 0   wt   k and 0   wt j t   1
2. Limited Cheating (Lim-Cheat).Between two audit dates, the maximum
exposure of the bank to the risky asset is the greater of (1) the level deter-
mined by its capital at the earlier audit date and (2) the exposure based on
its actual capital at the time. Here, the capital requirements regime is much
more eﬀective than under the Ext-Cheat rule. Its main deﬁciency is that
banks are able to conceal any decrease in capital from the level observed by
the regulator at the previous audit date and are therefore able to invest in
the risky asset up to an amount determined either by this amount or their
actual capital, whichever is higher.
(23) wj   max kj ; k     w   m
Two points are worth noting here. First, these rules are diﬀerent only
when banks are able to engage in risk management, since otherwise banks
choose their portfolios only on the audit date, when, under both regimes,
they comply with capital requirements. Second, since in our model a bank
is always able to liquidate its holding of risky assets and invest the proceeds
in the riskless asset (at which point the risk-based required capital is zero),
a bank will never be closed as a result of a violation of RBCR.
8.6.1 Eﬀect of RBCR on Welfare Function Variables
We now ask how changes in risk-based capital requirements aﬀect risk
taking when banks are able to engage in risk management and when capi-
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ing into account the constraints that RBCR place on its decisions. The en-
dogeneity of the bank’s capital decision, together with the opportunity for
insolvent banks to recapitalize,25 are critical determinants of behavior and
diﬀerentiate our approach from much of the previous literature on RBCR
(see Rochet 1992, Marshal and Venkatarman 1999, and Dangl and Lehar
2004).
The four panels of ﬁgure 8.5 show the eﬀect of changing  , the required
capital per unit of investment in the risky asset, on the four welfare func-
tion variables: the bank’s choice of capital, k∗, the PVDIL, the probability
of default,  , and the average investment in the risky asset, A  w  .
In our model and under both compliance regimes, a bank must be com-
pliant with RBCR at the time of an audit. It is important to stress that the
capital decision of the bank at this time is made jointly with its dynamic
portfolio policy. Thus the capital decision will take into account the op-
portunity that the bank will have to invest in the risky asset both (1) at the
audit date and (2) between audit dates, where the latter depends on the
compliance regime.
Panel A shows the level of capital, k∗, under Lim-Cheat (dotted line) 
and Ext-Cheat (solid line). With limited cheating, the banks’ choice of cap-
ital, k∗, increases monotonically with the value of  . In this case, the initial
capital decision establishes a lower bound on the maximum exposure to
the risky asset up to the next audit date. For the parameters used in our cal-
culations (see ﬁg. 8.5), it is optimal for the bank to hold an amount of cap-
ital, approximately26 equal to  , that allows it to hold the maximum
amount of the risky asset. This result is robust for quite a wide range of pa-
rameter values. The only parameter that has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the re-
sult is the proportional cost of recapitalization, v, and when this is high it
leads the shareholders to decide initially not to open the bank rather than
to hold a lower level of capital.
With extensive cheating, the capital decision is diﬀerent. When   is be-
low a value of approximately 4 percent, that is, when RBCR are relatively
unburdensome, it is again optimal for the bank to comply.
This occurs because our example considers only a limited number of
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25. Surprisedly, little research on banking either the level of capital or the franchise value
as endogenous, and little research takes into account either the dynamic risk management or
the options to recapitalize or close. An analysis of endogenous capital closely related to our
own is Froot and Stein (1998). They assume convex costs of capital issue and examine the im-
plications for bank risk management, capital structure, and capital budgeting. But they do
not allow for bank regulation or deposit insurance and, since theirs is a static model, they are
unable to explore the potential implications of an endogenous franchise value. Another is
Milne and Whalley (2001), but they do not consider risk-based capital requirements.
26. The relationship between  and k∗is not one-to-one, because the former is the required
capital per unit invested in the risky asset and the latter is the amount of capital expressed as
a fraction of deposits. If 100 percent of the assets is invested in risky assets, the relation be-
tween the two is: k   /(1 –  ).portfolio revision opportunities between audit dates and, in order to invest
as much as possible in the risky asset on the audit date (when the bank must
comply), the bank chooses a high level of capital. Clearly, if the frequency
of portfolio revision were higher (or if recapitalization costs were high), the
bank would reduce its level of initial capital.
When   is above 4 percent, the bank’s optimal strategy changes and it
now chooses a low level of capital and a lower investment in the risky asset
on the audit date. At ﬁrst sight the result that an increase in capital re-
quirements results in both lower levels of capital and less investment in the
risky asset may be surprising. We might expect that increasing capital re-
quirements would lead either to higher levels of capital and a maintained
level of investment in the risky asset or a maintained level of capital and a
lower investment in the risky asset.
This counterintuitive result comes about for the following reason. The
amount of capital, k, aﬀects the franchise value through the value of the de-
posit insurance put, the probability of default, and the expected cost of re-
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Fig. 8.5 Pillar 1–risk-based capital requirements
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of changing the required capital per unit of investment in the
risky asset  on the four welfare function variables: capital utilization k∗, Present Value of De-
posit Insurance Liabilities (PVDIL), probability of default  , and the average investment in
risky asset A  w  . The parameters used are: D   100, k ˆ   1 percent, n   4, r   5 percent,   
10 percent,   5 percent.capitalization. Increasing k allows the bank to increase its holding of the
risky asset but also increases the “strike” of the deposit insurance put and,
for this reason, an increase in kmay either increase or decrease the value of
the deposit insurance put, the probability of default, and the expected cost
of recapitalization. Therefore, the eﬀect of increasing k on the franchise
value may be either positive or negative.
In our example, increasing k leads to increases in the franchise value for
values of  below around 4 percent but decreases for values above this level.
The threshold level where the bank’s policy changes—around 4 percent 
in this case—is strongly related to the volatility of the risky asset, the fre-
quency of portfolio revision, and the cost of recapitalization.
The eﬀect of changing the capital requirements parameter  , on the
other three welfare variables can be easily understood in terms of its eﬀect
on k∗.
With Lim-cheat, because (as the regulator would hope), higher RBCR
induce the bank to increase capital, the average investment in the risky as-
set (A  w  ) remains almost unchanged, the PVDIL and the probability of de-
fault decreases monotonically with   (as shown in panels B, C, and D). In
this case, we also ﬁnd that the average investment in the risky asset is little
aﬀected by changes in  .
With Ext-cheat, the results follow those for k∗ and fall into two regimes.
For low values of   they mirror those for the Lim-cheat case since, in this
case, the bank chooses to comply. For higher values of  , however, the bank
chooses a low level of capital. In this case, the average investment in the
risky asset ﬁrst decreases and then remains unaﬀected by  . Because both
PVDIL and the probability of default are insensitive to increases in  ,
RBCR in this case remain ineﬀective.
Our results emphasize that allowing for the behavioral response on the
part of banks in terms of capital and portfolio management is critical to a
proper evaluation of the eﬀects of changes in regulation ( ). In the QIS car-
ried out by the Basel Committee, the behavioral response was ignored. Our
results also show that the behavioral response itself depends on the way the
formal rules actually work in practice; that is, the scope they give for banks
to cheat.
8.7 Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 (PCA)
The results on RBCR in the previous section are presented to provide a
benchmark against which to assess the role of Pillar 2/PCA when applied
in conjunction with Pillar 1. We investigate this issue for the two cheating
regimes described and analyzed earlier.
Recall that, in our framework, Pillar 2/PCA acts as a minimum capital
requirement (k ˆ ) at the time of an audit, where k ˆ   k  —that is, Pillar 2/PCA
maximum leverage is a more binding constraint on capital than the simple
402 Loriana Pelizzon and Stephen Schaefersolvency constraint k  . Because it is independent of the composition of the
bank’s portfolio it therefore acts simply as a constraint on leverage. If a
bank violates the Pillar 2/PCA constraint27 at audit and chooses to recapi-
talize, it incurs a ﬁxed cost, C, in addition to the variable cost, v, described
earlier. In our calculations, k ˆ , the maximum capital level, is set at 4 percent.
Figure 8.6 shows the eﬀect on the four output variables from changing
the required capital per unit of risky asset,  , when Pillar 2/PCA is applied
in conjunction with RBCR.
When the level of compliance with RBCR is good (Lim-cheat)—see
panels A–D—Pillar 2/PCA has relatively little eﬀect. For values of  above
the threshold level k ˆ the value of k∗ is driven by RBCR and is eﬀectively
unchanged from the result with Pillar 1 alone. The same applies to PVDIL
and the average investment in the risky asset. The frequency of default,
however, increases, because the ﬁxed cost of recapitalization means that
banks will more often choose to close rather than recapitalize. Therefore,
when the level of compliance with RBCR is good, Pillar 2/PCA may actu-
ally reduce welfare when it increases both banks’ costs (recapitalization)
and the probability of default.
For values of   below the threshold level k ˆ the latter becomes the eﬀec-
tive minimum value of k∗. This is because when   is below k ˆ , and even if
the bank were to invest entirely in the risky asset, its required capital under
RBCR would be lower than k ˆ . This is reﬂected in the behavior of k∗ (panel
A), PVDIL (panel B) and   (panel C) of ﬁgure 8.6.
However, Pillar 2/PCA plays a potentially important role when compli-
ance with RBCR is poor (Ext-cheat). However, as we show, in this case it
acts more as a substitute for, rather than a complement to RBCR.
The solid line in panel E of ﬁgure 8.6 shows the value of k∗under RBCR
from the earlier analysis. The minimum value of capital under Pillar 2/PCA
is k ˆ and the dotted line in panel E shows that, in our example, this is also
the value of k∗ for all values of  .28
Panel (E) shows that Pillar 2/PCA is successful in increasing the level of
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27. The prompt corrective action scheme has been in eﬀect in the United States since the
passage in 1991 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act. The scheme deﬁnes a se-
ries of trigger points based on a bank’s capitalization and a set of mandatory actions for su-
pervisors to implement at each point. The series of actions that FDIC must implement is de-
tailed in the Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies. If a trigger point is violated
the ﬁrst action given in the manual is to require the bank to propose a capital restoration plan.
Our closure rule is designed to conform to the spirit of this requirement.
28. Two points related to k ˆ in panel (E) of ﬁgure 8.6 should be noted. First, in our example,
the threshold level of around 4 percent for   that induced a shift in portfolio composition un-
der RBCR happens in this case to be close to the value we have chosen for k ˆ . This means that
in panel E of ﬁgure 8.6 the two lines coincide for a value of   close to 4 percent. Second, for
values of k ˆ that are suﬃciently low so that it is not a binding constraint for all values of  , the
value of k∗may diﬀer from the value obtained with Pillar 1 alone. The reason is that, although
for some value of  , k ˆ may not be a currently binding constraint, the fact that it may be a bind-
ing constraint in some future state of the world may induce a diﬀerent capital decision now.Fig. 8.6 Pillar 2/PCA
Notes: Under Pillar 2/PCA, the ﬁgure plots the eﬀect of changing the required capital per unit
of investment in the risky asset   on the four output variables: capital utilization k∗, Present
Value of Deposit Insurance Liabilities (PVDIL), probability of default  , and the average in-
vestment in risky asset A  w  . The parameters used are: D 100, k ˆ  4 percent, n 4, r 5 per-
cent,   10 percent,   5 percent, C   1.capital that banks hold: in our example, k∗ is higher for all value of   ex-
cept 4 percent, where it is the same. However, as panel E also shows, with
poor compliance Pillar 2/PCA does not succeed in reestablishing the link
between actual bank capital and RBCR. In other words, it does not correct
the ineﬀectiveness of RBCR that a poor compliance regime produces.
Panel E shows that the amount of capital that the bank holds is the same
when   10 percent as it is when   1 percent, even though the average
risky asset holding in the two cases diﬀers by only about 20 percent. Thus
Pillar 2/PCA does not complement RBCR in the sense of increasing the
sensitivity of bank capital to  .
Panel F of ﬁgure 8.6 shows that Pillar 2/PCA does indeed reduce the
PVDIL but, as with the level of capital, does so in a way that is almost in-
dependent of  . Comparing panels F and G shows that this reduction in
PVDIL is not brought about by a reduction in the frequency of default ( ),
but as a result of the higher level of capital that banks hold. This reduces
the average liability of the deposit insurer compared with the case without
Pillar 2. As just mentioned, panel G shows that there is little eﬀect on the
probability of default (except for low values of  ) even though capital lev-
els are higher; this is a result of the ﬁxed cost of recapitalization that leads
banks to default more often. For low values of  , particularly for values
just lower than the threshold value of 4 percent, banks hold more capital
than without Pillar 2/PCA and, again as a result of the ﬁxed cost of recap-
italization, now default more often.
Finally, panel H shows that because it forces banks to hold more capital,
for   greater than around 4 percent. Pillar 2/PCA allows them to increase
the amount they hold in the risky asset. For low values of   the risky-asset
holding is actually lower, because the higher threshold level for recapital-
ization under Pillar 2/PCA means that when asset prices fall the bank re-
duces its holding in the risky asset (i.e., initiates a portfolio insurance pol-
icy) sooner.
8.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the interaction between Pillar 1 (risk-based cap-
ital requirements) and Pillar 2/PCA and, in particular, the role of closure
rules with costly recapitalization and where banks are able to manage their
portfolios dynamically.
In our analysis we make the perhaps extreme assumption that the only
source of rents in the banking system is deposit insurance. In a static set-
ting, we know from Merton’s (1977) model that banks will choose the port-
folio with the maximum risk. However, in a multiperiod setting, taking into
account the possibility of costly recapitalization, banks have an incentive
to manage their portfolios dynamically. As a consequence, the cost of de-
posit insurance is aﬀected by the cost of recapitalization and its eﬀect on
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of costs of recapitalization reduce the cost of deposit insurance but in-
crease the probability of default.
A feature of our approach is to consider the costs as well as the beneﬁts
of capital regulation and to do so in a way that accommodates the behav-
ioral response of banks in terms of their portfolio strategy and capital
structure decisions and, further, the extent to which capital rules are eﬀec-
tive—that is, the extent to which banks can cheat.
We measure the eﬀects of capital regulation, for both Pillars 1 and 2, in
terms of four output variables that we use as proxies for the costs and ben-
eﬁts—both private and social—of capital regulation.
Without cheating, the problem of bank capital adequacy is relatively mi-
nor and is related largely to discontinuity in asset prices, which would lead
to diﬃculties in implementing a stopping policy. However, the regulator
faces a much more diﬃcult problem when banks are able to deviate signif-
icantly from capital adequacy. Thus, the extent of banks’ ability to cheat is
fundamental to the analysis of capital requirements. For this reason in our
analysis we consider two cases, one with extensive cheating and the other
with only limited cheating.
Our results fall into two parts. First, in order to establish a benchmark
for assessing the eﬀect of Pillar 2/PCA, we analyze the eﬀect of RBCR in
our model with imperfect compliance but without Pillar 2/PCA interven-
tion. In the second part, we introduce Pillar 2/PCA.
Without Pillar 2/PCA, we ﬁnd that even when banks’ compliance is rel-
atively good (limited cheating) RBCR may nonetheless be eﬀective in 
the sense that, for higher levels of RBCR, banks do indeed hold higher
amounts of capital. As result, (1) the PVDIL is lower and (2) the probabil-
ity of default is also lower. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that in this case, an in-
crease in RBCR does not reduce the volume of risky assets that a bank is
willing to hold (and therefore there does not appear to be a signiﬁcant neg-
ative externality from reduced bank activity).
However, when compliance is poor (extensive cheating), RBCR are in-
eﬀective in the sense that for higher levels of RBCR banks do not increase
their volume of capital. Consequently, increasing RBCR decreases neither
(1) the PVDIL nor (2) the probability of default. Moreover, we ﬁnd that, in
this case, the volume of risky assets held by banks decreases the RBCR in-
crease because banks choose to increase their leverage rather than hold
higher volumes of both capital and risky assets.
The degree of compliance with RBCR is similarly crucial in assessing
the role of Pillar 2/PCA. If banks were to comply with RBCR continuously
Pillar 2/PCA would be redundant. Only where there is the possibility of at
least some noncompliance does this type of intervention have a potential
role.
We investigate this issue for the two cheating regimes considered in the
paper. With limited cheat Pillar 2/PCA has little eﬀect on the level of capi-
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set. The frequency of default, however, increases. The potential role that
PVCA/Pillar 2 may play is as a complement to RBCR, not as a substitute.
When the level of compliance with RBCR is good, Pillar 2/PCA may actu-
ally reduce welfare because it increases both banks’ costs (recapitalization)
and the probability of default.
However, Pillar 2/PCA plays a potentially important role with extensive
cheating, although the results are complex. Introducing Pillar 2/PCA in-
creases the amount of capital that banks hold but does not result in a more
eﬀective RBCR regime in the sense that, even with Pillar 2/PCA, increas-
ing RBCR does not result in higher levels of capital. The same result ap-
plies to the probability of default, the PVDIL, and the average investment
in the risky asset. Introducing Pillar 2/PCA lowers PVDIL but, as before,
increasing RBCR does not further strongly reduce PVDIL. For the prob-
ability of default the results are mixed but, once again, introducing Pillar
2/PCA does not make the probability of default sensitive to the level of
RBCR. The results on the average investment in the risky asset are simi-
larly mixed, but the striking result is that, for higher levels of RBCR, the
bank’s investment in the risky asset decreases. In general, when extensive
cheating is possible, Pillar 2/PCA does not complement RBCR in the sense
of making them more eﬀective; rather, they act as a separate, substitute
form of regulatory control.
Because we ﬁnd that Pillar 2/PCA is most eﬀective in reducing the cost
of deposit insurance when compliance is relatively poor, we might infer
from the fact that (1) in the United States, the FDIC has chosen to intro-
duce PCA after Basel I and (2) the Basel Committee has included Pillar 2,
that all these regulators perceive the degree of compliance—for at least
some banks—to be relatively poor.
In making this observation it is important to bear in mind that our anal-
ysis suggests that, when the level of compliance is high, there may be few
beneﬁts to oﬀset the costs of Pillar 2/PCA (the frictional costs of recapi-
talization).
Both these points suggest that future work in the area of RBCR should
pay more attention to compliance rather than simply the design of the rules.
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Comment Marc Saidenberg
Pelizzon and Schaefer’s paper takes another step in their research program,
which examines the implications for regulation of bank portfolio choice 
in a dynamic setting. The current paper examines the eﬀects of capital re-
quirements under various assumptions about regulators’ ability to detect
and punish undercapitalization. Some of the paper’s ideas have been in the
academic literature for many years. For example, the idea that capital re-
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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the
position of Merrill Lynch & Co., of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal
Reserves System.quirements, regulators’ bank closure practices, and deposit insurance pric-
ing are intimately related, with any one of them serving as a suﬃcient re-
straint on bank risk taking in simple setups, has been around at least since
the early 1990s (for example, Acharya and Dreyfus 1989, Davies and Mc-
Manus 1991, and Levonian 1991 analyzed closure rules). Pelizzaon and
Schaeﬀer’s result, that capital requirements might increase bank risk-
taking as well as reduce it, was a result in Koehn and Santomero (1980) as
well. Another example of a precursor is Ritchken, Thomson, DeGennaro,
and Li (1995), which presents a dynamic model in which banks’ ability to
alter their risk postures between regulatory audits leads to a richer de-
scription of risk taking than in one-period models.1
Pelizzon and Schaefer’s work represents an important contribution be-
cause it brings together many ideas about an important subject in a nice
modeling framework. In the richest version of their model, banks choose
their risk posture not only at the time regulators examine solvency, but also
at points in between such audits (so the regulatory closure rule is not per-
fectly eﬀective at maintaining solvency). Importantly, banks can com-
pletely change their risk posture, without transaction costs, from one mo-
ment to the next. Banks face two kinds of capital requirements: a simple
leverage ratio and a risk-based capital requirement. The risk-based mea-
sure is a perfect indicator of risk posture, and the regulator can observe
compliance perfectly at the time of an audit. However, the regulator can
observe compliance in between audits imperfectly or not at all. Another
important innovation of the setup is that a bank in violation of capital re-
quirements has a (costly) right to recapitalize. Deposit insurance is ﬂat rate
and serves only to make the depositors insensitive to risk; that is, the im-
plications of risk-sensitive deposit insurance in combination with rich clo-
sure rules and capital requirements are not analyzed, which is a reason-
able simpliﬁcation. The model is nice because many things of interest are
endogenous: bank risk posture, capital level, dividend payouts, and the
bank’s decision whether to recapitalize.
Some of the terminology is a bit diﬀerent than that used in many other
papers. “Risk management” means the bank is able to change its risk pos-
ture between audits. In other papers and in the practitioner community, the
phrase often refers to the systems and activities that help ﬁnancial institu-
tions (and other ﬁrms) measure, optimize, and control their risk posture.
Banks have long been able to change their risk postures in between the an-
nual (or less frequent) examinations that are common in the United States,
but modern quantitative risk management systems are a relatively recent
innovation.
In Pelizzon and Schaefer’s model, “Pillar 2” is the existence of a leverage
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1. Berger, Herring, and Szegö’s (1995) survey on capital, and Berlin, Saunders, and Udell’s
(1991) survey on deposit insurance include many references to other related papers.ratio capital requirement (alongside a risk-based capital requirement),
with violations of the leverage requirement leading to seizure by regulators
in the event the bank does not recapitalize, or increased regulatory costs if
it does recapitalize. In common parlance, “Pillar 2” is a term introduced by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and refers to a broad array
of regulatory responsibilities and actions.
Although the paper’s formal deﬁnition of Pillar 2 is narrow, the title of
the paper is apt, because the paper’s most interesting results ﬂow from
varying the assumption about the eﬀectiveness of regulatory monitoring of
capital adequacy, and Pillar 2 is all about the eﬀectiveness of regulatory
monitoring. As the minimum required capital ratio varies, so do average
levels of bank capital, the value of the deposit insurance put option, bank
failure rates, and loan volume, but the behavior of such variables of inter-
est is much diﬀerent when regulatory monitoring is eﬀective than when it
is not. Behavior is also diﬀerent with a leverage ratio capital requirement
and a risk-based capital requirement than with a risk-based capital re-
quirement alone.
In drawing conclusions about the eﬃcacy of “Pillar 2,” the authors
choose to emphasize diﬀerences in outcomes between the with-leverage-
ratio and no-leverage-ratio cases, whereas I prefer to focus on diﬀerences
when regulatory enforcement of capital requirements is less versus more
eﬀective. The authors emphasize that “Pillar 2” should be applied with
care, because imposition of leverage-ratio capital requirements on top of
relatively eﬀectively enforced risk-based capital requirements can be unde-
sirable (bank failure rates increase, and risk taking that perhaps is socially
desirable by banks decreases). I prefer to emphasize their ﬁnding that good
enforcement of capital requirements is better than weak enforcement.
Pretty much regardless of whether a leverage-ratio capital requirement is
imposed or not, variables of interest behave sensibly (and, in my opinion,
desirably) as the risk-based capital requirement is varied when enforce-
ment is good. When enforcement is weak, varying capital requirements of-
ten has little eﬀect on outcomes and sometimes has perverse eﬀects. That
is, Pelizzon and Schaefer’s results imply that Pillar 2 in the Basel Commit-
tee’s meaning of the term is a good thing.2
The subtitle of the Pillar 2 section of the new Basel Accord is “supervi-
sory review process.” I can oﬀer a practicing supervisor’s perspective of
how supervisory review is related to formal capital regulation at very large
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2. I prefer to emphasize the enforcement results in part because, in Pelizzon and Schaefer’s
setup, a bank can costlessly remedy violations of risk-based capital requirements, whereas
leverage-ratio violations must be ﬁxed by costly recapitalizations. I suspect the diﬀerence in
costs is at least in part responsible for the apparently undesirable eﬀects of leverage-ratio re-
quirements on bank failure rates and investment policies. Moreover, leverage ratios and as-
sociated PCA mechanisms are present only in a subset of nations, most notably the United
States, whereas some form if Pillar 2 (whether weak or strong) is widespread.banks. Although supervisory reviews are concerned with many things
other than capital adequacy, I will focus only on capital. And I emphasize
again that these are my views, not those of the Federal Reserve, and that I
focus on large banks.
A paraphrasing of the four principles that appear in the Accord’s Pillar
2 section is helpful.
• Each bank should assess internal capital adequacy in light of its risk
proﬁle.
• Supervisors should review internal assessments and take action as ap-
propriate.
• Banks should hold capital above regulatory minimums.
• Supervisors should intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from
falling below levels appropriate to the risk characteristics of the bank.
Notice that regulatory minimums are mentioned only once, and then with
the implication that de facto minimums ﬂowing from banks’ internal as-
sessments should usually be the ones that are binding.
Ideally, the real capital requirements ﬂow from Pillar 2. Pillar 1 require-
ments are an important part of the setup because they represent a frame-
work for relating risk and capital that can help organize the discussion be-
tween the bank and supervisor.3 But for large banks, which are complex
and often at the forefront of ﬁnancial innovation, the risk measurement
schemes embedded in Pillar 1 regulations will always be an incomplete ap-
proximation for any given bank.
How would it work in the ideal case? A large bank would have a series of
formal risk exposure and capital allocation models, each dealing with dif-
ferent kinds of risks, and a way of aggregating the risk levels and capital
requirements the models estimate. For risks that are not formally modeled,
the bank would have ad hoc procedures for judging the exposure and
adding appropriate capital to the aggregate. Suppose the whole exercise is
done monthly, with reporting to senior management (in reality, for risks
that can change rapidly, the exercise is done at much higher frequency). Su-
pervisors would review the reports and make their own assessment of cap-
ital adequacy relative to risk. To do so, supervisors must understand the
nature of the risks the bank takes and the models the bank uses, and this in
turn requires a nearly continuous dialog with relevant bank personnel.
Obviously, in such a setup, supervisors would be aware as quickly as the
bank itself of major changes in risk posture and capital adequacy. This puts
them in a position to intervene early in the sense of suggesting that risk be
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3. And, in the event of a disagreement, formal capital regulations provide a set of legally
veriﬁable standards that make it easier for the supervisor to address challenges to its au-
thority.shed or capital be raised. But this is neither the most common nor the 
most important form of supervisory early intervention, because at a well-
functioning bank, the management would act anyway upon receiving in-
formation that capital adequacy or risk has changed. More important is a
kind of intervention in the bank’s internal procedures. Most of all, super-
visors want to be comfortable that the bank understands the risks it is tak-
ing and that it has reasonably robust procedures for maintaining capital
adequacy. Supervisors are usually reluctant to dictate details of formal
models or of procedures. But supervisors are in a good position to notice
that a bank may be entirely ignoring a material class of risk, or that its
models or procedures are seriously ﬂawed, because supervisors are able to
observe the inner workings of many banks.
As large banks have become ever larger and more complex institutions,
supervisors have put increasing emphasis on the Pillar 2 processes I have
just sketched. It is comforting that Pelizzon and Schaefer’s results imply
that the improved maintenance of capital adequacy that such processes
foster leads to better economic outcomes than situations where supervi-
sory evaluations are infrequent and less eﬀective. Of course, the optimal
design of Pillar 2 processes is itself an important research question, and I
hope that future work will shed more light on it.
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Charles Calomiris opened the general discussion with two observations: 
(1) Pillar 2 cannot be assumed to work, so market discipline is important as
well, and (2) during times of stress (meaning reduced solvency), asset sub-
stitution by banks is toward risks that often are not socially productive
(gambling for redemption), so both regulatory and market monitoring of
banks is especially important in crisis situations.
Ross Levinesuggested an additional motivation for the tradeoﬀbetween
failure risk and productive investment that the authors emphasize. Espe-
cially outside the industrialized countries, stronger supervisory powers are
often used by bank regulators to direct lending to politically favored con-
stituencies, and such loans are often not economically productive.
Patricia Jackson defended the importance of Pillar 2, noting that even
the relatively sophisticated formulas of the Basel II Pillar-1 regime will 
not reﬂect all the risks faced by banks. With regard to the claim that Pillar
1 was already conservative, it targeted a credit value-at-risk (VaR) per-
centile, which is the equivalent of a rating riskier than single-A. However,
large banks that are systemically important are not likely to be viable if
rated riskier than A-minus because many counterparties would refuse to
deal with them. Prompt corrective actions triggered by changes in Pillar-1
regulatory capital adequacy almost surely would come too late in such
cases. Martin Feldstein added that what amounted to Pillar 2 actions by
U.S. bank supervisors seemed to work to prevent a systemic crisis in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Richard Evans noted that many managers of
large banks have been concerned that Pillar 2 will be applied inconsistently
across nations, but that the recent formation by regulators of a “college of
supervisors” oﬀers hope that inconsistencies may be modest. Such coop-
eration among supervisors may also reduce systemic risk by promoting
good cooperation among supervisors internationally in a crisis.
To shed light on whether capital requirements are binding, Martin Feld-
stein asked for evidence that Basel I increased regulatory capital require-
ments. Mark Carey recalled that book-capital ratios of U.S. banks reached
a trough in the late 1980s and increased substantially after implementation
of Basel I, and that recent papers by Mark Flannery and Kasturi Rangan
oﬀer evidence that market-price-based measures of bank leverage also im-
ply an increase since the 1980s. Richard Evans observed that large dealer
banks strive to choose their leverage based on economic considerations,
balancing the need for a buﬀer stock of capital to support capturing rap-
idly developing market opportunities with a desire to maximize share-
holder value, which sometimes is best done by dividend payouts or share
repurchases. However,  Basel I requirements have been a constraint at
times, and do seem to aﬀect the decision making of some banks.
414 Loriana Pelizzon and Stephen SchaeferResponding to the authors’ remarks about the absence of clear discus-
sions in regulatory documents of the market failure that capital require-
ments are meant to address, Mark Carey observed that such ambiguity
arises because regulators have too many hypotheses about the nature of
such market failures, not no hypotheses at all, and moreover that intuition
suggests that the weight placed on diﬀerent possible market failures is
likely to be diﬀerent over time, across nations, and in the case of large and
small banks. Thus, it is diﬃcult for regulators to produce a concise treat-
ment. But he agreed that research on the nature of such market failures
could produce large beneﬁts.
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